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Abstract Cameras mounted on Micro Aerial Vehicles
(MAVs) are increasingly used for recreational photogra-
phy. However, aerial photographs of public places often
contain faces of bystanders thus leading to a perceived
or actual violation of privacy. To address this issue, we
propose to pseudo-randomly modify the appearance of
face regions in the images using a privacy filter that pre-
vents a human or a face recogniser from inferring the
identities of people. The filter, which is applied only
when the resolution is high enough for a face to be
recognisable, adaptively distorts the face appearance as
a function of its resolution. Moreover, the proposed fil-
ter locally changes its parameters to discourage attacks
that use parameter estimation. The filter exploits both
global adaptiveness to reduce distortion and local hop-
ping of the parameters to make their estimation difficult
for an attacker. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the
proposed approach, we use a state-of-the-art face recog-
nition algorithm and synthetically generated face data
with 3D geometric image transformations that mimic
faces captured from an MAV at different heights and
pitch angles. Experimental results show that the pro-
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1 Introduction
MAVs are becoming common platforms for a number
of civilian applications such as search and rescue (Wa-
harte and Trigoni, 2010), disaster management (Quar-
itsch et al., 2010) and news reporting (Babiceanu et al.,
2015). Moreover, individuals use MAVs equipped with
high resolution cameras for recreational photography
and videography in public places during sports activi-
ties and social gatherings (AirDog, 2018; Hexo+, 2018).
Such use in public places raises privacy concerns as by-
standers who happen to be within the field of view of
the camera are captured as well. The identity of by-
standers could be protected by locating and removing
(or sufficiently distorting) key image regions, such as
faces, using algorithms called privacy filters. However,
in order to maintain the aesthetic value of an image,
only a minimal distortion of the image content should
be allowed.
A privacy filter for recreational aerial photography
should satisfy the following properties: (a) introduce
only a minimal distortion; (b) be robust against attacks;
and (c) be computationally efficient. Minimal distortion
is necessary to maintain quality of a protected image
close to the unprotected one so that the attention of
a viewer is not diverted. Therefore blanking out a face
(Schiff et al., 2007) is not a desirable option. Robustness
is important to avoid privacy violations by various at-
tacks, e.g. brute-force, na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction
attacks (Boult, 2005; Dong et al., 2016; Dufaux and
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Ebrahimi, 2008; Erdelyi et al., 2014; Korshunov and
Ebrahimi, 2014; Kundur and Hatzinakos, 1996; Newton
et al., 2005). A brute-force attack tries to decipher the
protected probe images by an exhaustive search (Boult,
2005; Dufaux and Ebrahimi, 2008). Other attacks use
gallery images in addition to the protected probe im-
ages (Dong et al., 2016; Erdelyi et al., 2014; Korshunov
and Ebrahimi, 2014; Newton et al., 2005). In a na¨ıve at-
tack, the protected probe images are compared against
the unprotected gallery images (Erdelyi et al., 2014;
Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014; Newton et al., 2005).
In a parrot attack, the attacker has knowledge about
the privacy filter and can transform the gallery images
into the distorted domain (Newton et al., 2005). In a
reconstruction attack, the attacker has some knowledge
of how to (partially) reconstruct the probe image from
the protected to the unprotected domain (Kundur and
Hatzinakos, 1996). Examples of reconstruction methods
include inverse filtering and super-resolution techniques
(Dong et al., 2016; Kundur and Hatzinakos, 1996). Fi-
nally, computational efficiency is desirable when the fil-
ter operates using the limited computational and bat-
tery power of a MAV.
Privacy filters for aerial photography need to face
challenges caused by the ego-motion of the camera,
changing illumination conditions, and variable face ori-
entation and resolution. Recent frameworks that sup-
port facial privacy-preservation in airborne cameras are
Generic Data Encryption (Kim et al., 2014), Unmanned
Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard (Babiceanu et al.,
2015) and Adaptive Gaussian Blur (Sarwar et al., 2016).
Generic Data Encryption sends an encrypted face re-
gion to a privacy server that Gaussian blurs or mosaics
the face and then forwards it to an end-user. Unmanned
Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard (Babiceanu et al.,
2015) and Adaptive Gaussian Blur (Sarwar et al., 2016)
are aimed instead at on-board implementation with an
objective to reduce latency and discourage brute-force
attacks on the server (Kim et al., 2014). Adaptive Gaus-
sian Blur adaptively configures the Gaussian kernel de-
pending upon the face resolution in order to minimise
distortion, while Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Pri-
vacy Guard blurs faces with a fixed filter. These meth-
ods are prone to parrot attacks (Newton et al., 2005)
on the Gaussian blur.
In this paper, we present a novel privacy protec-
tion filter to be used on-board an MAV. The proposed
filter distorts a face region with secret parameters to
be robust to na¨ıve, parrot and reconstruction attacks.
The distortion is minimal and adaptive to the resolu-
tion of the captured face: we select the smallest Gaus-
sian kernel that reduces the face resolution below a cer-
tain threshold. The selected threshold protects the face
against the na¨ıve attack as well as maintains its res-
olution at a specified level. To prevent other attacks,
we then insert supplementary Gaussian kernels in the
selected Gaussian kernel and hop their parameters lo-
cally using a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
so their estimation is difficult from the filtered face im-
age. The block diagram of the proposed filter is shown
in Figure 1.
In contrast to airborne photography, an updated
work based on the proposed filter is presented in Sarwar
et al. (2018), specifically for the airborne videography.
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) basic idea
of the Gaussian hopping kernels and their details, (2) a
large-scale synthetic face image data set emulating faces
captured from an MAV, and (3) extensive experiments
to validate the proposed Gaussian hopping kernels, in-
cluding the reconstruction attacks.
The paper is organised as follows. Sec. 2 covers the
state-of-the-art in visual privacy protection filters. Sec. 3
defines the problem. Sec. 4 describes the proposed algo-
rithm, and discusses its computational complexity and
security level. Sec. 5 presents our face data set genera-
tion and Sec. 6 discuss the experimental results. Finally,
Sec. 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
Visual privacy protection filters can be applied as pre-
processing or post-processing (Fig. 2). Pre-processing
privacy filters are irreversible and operate during image
acquisition to prevent a camera from capturing sensitive
regions. These filters disable the software or hardware
of the camera or notify about photography prohibition
(Safe Haven, 2003). Hardware based filters prevent the
camera from taking images for example by bursting
back an intense light for flash photography (Eagle Eye,
1997; Zhu et al., 2017) or by detecting human faces us-
ing an infrared sensor and then obfuscating using a spa-
tial light modulator sensor placed in front of the Charge
Coupled Device (CCD) sensor (Zhang et al., 2014).
Post-processing privacy filters protect sensitive re-
gions after image acquisition and can be reversible or
irreversible. Reversible filters conceal sensitive regions
using a private key, which can later be used to recover
the original sensitive region. Irreversible filters deform
the features of a sensitive region permanently. Both re-
versible and irreversible filters can be non-adaptive or
adaptive.
Reversible non-adaptive filters are based on generic
encryption (Boult, 2005; Chattopadhyay and Boult, 2007;
Rahman et al., 2010; Winkler and Rinner, 2011; Zhang
et al., 2018). Reversible adaptive filters include scram-
bling (Baaziz et al., 2007; Dufaux and Ebrahimi, 2006,
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of the proposed Adaptive Hopping Gaussian Mixture Model filter. KEY – ρh, ρv: number
of pixels (px) per unit distance (cm) (pixel densities) of a sensitive region R; h1, θP : altitude and tilt angle of the
camera used to calculate the pixel densities; ωR: control signal generated from the pixel densities to decide when
to protect R; R: sub-regions of R; σoo , σov: standard deviations for the hopping Gaussian mixture model M that
filters R to generate the protected sub-regions R¯; Ip: protected image.
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Fig. 2: A taxonomy of visual privacy protection filters.
2008; Ruchaud and Dugelay, 2017; Sohn et al., 2011),
warping (Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2013b) and morph-
ing (Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2013a). While reversible
adaptive filters are robust against a parrot attack, their
protected faces can be compromised by spatial-domain
(Jiang et al., 2016a,b) or frequency-domain attacks (Rash-
wan et al., 2015).
Irreversible non-adaptive filters blank out (Koelle
et al., 2018; Schiff et al., 2007) or replace a face with a
de-identified representation (Newton et al., 2005). For
example, to maintain k-anonymity, the algorithm ”k-
Same” (Newton et al., 2005) replaces k faces with their
average face. Variants of this algorithm use additional
specialised detectors to then preserve attributes such
as facial expressions, pose, gender, race, age (Du et al.,
2014; Gross et al., 2006; Letournel et al., 2015; Lin et al.,
2012; Meden et al., 2018). Irreversible non-adaptive fil-
ters are robust to parrot attacks. Irreversible adaptive
filters lower the resolution of a sensitive region so that
humans or algorithms cannot recognise the identity. Ex-
amples include pixelation (Chinomi et al., 2008), Gaus-
sian blur (Wickramasuriya et al., 2004) and cartooning
(Erdelyi et al., 2014). The kernel size of the privacy fil-
ters can be manually selected (Erdelyi et al., 2014; Kor-
shunov and Ebrahimi, 2014) or the centre kernel size is
manually selected and then the Space Variant Gaussian
Blur (SVBG) filter (Saini et al., 2012) automatically de-
creases the kernel size from the centre to the boundary
of the detected face. AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) exploits
the different horizontal and vertical resolutions that are
typical in aerial photography, and automatically adapts
an anisotropic kernel based on the resolution of the de-
tected face. However, irreversible adaptive filters are
vulnerable to parrot attacks.
As a summary, Table 1 compares representative fil-
ters for the following categories: reversible & adaptive
(Dufaux and Ebrahimi, 2008), reversible & non-adaptive
(Boult, 2005), and irreversible & non-adaptive filters
(Du et al., 2014). The rest (Babiceanu et al., 2015;
Erdelyi et al., 2014; Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014;
Saini et al., 2012; Sarwar et al., 2016) and proposed are
irreversible & adaptive filters.
3 Problem Definition
Let the set D = {Rk}Kk=1 contain face data of K sub-
jects, where k represents the identity (labels). Let each
subject k appear in at most Z images, i.e.Rk = {Ri|i ≤
Z}. Let RG ,RP ⊂ D be the gallery and probe sets,
respectively. Usually |RG | > |RP |, where |.| is the car-
dinality of a set, and RG ∩RP = ∅.
Let a privacy filter FΩj : RP → R¯P distort im-
age features in order to reduce the probability P for
an attacker to correctly predict labels. This operation
produces a protected probe set R¯P , whose distortion
depends on Ωj , where j ∈ {h, v} indicates the horizon-
tal and vertical direction in an image. Let the distortion
generated by FΩj be measured by the Peak Signal to
Noise Ratio (PSNR):
PSNR = 20 log10
Rmax√
MSE
, (1)
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Table 1: Post-processing privacy filters. KEY – DCT-S: Discrete Cosine Transform Scrambling (Dufaux and
Ebrahimi, 2008); PICO: Privacy through Invertible Cryptographic Obscuration (Boult, 2005); GARP: Gender,
Age and Race Preservation (Du et al., 2014); UAS-VPG: Unmanned Aircraft Systems-Visual Privacy Guard
(Babiceanu et al., 2015); Cartooning (Erdelyi et al., 2014); SVGB: Space Variant Gaussian Blur (Saini et al., 2012);
ODBVP: Optimal Distortion-Based Visual Privacy (Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014); AGB: Adaptive Gaussian
Blur (Sarwar et al., 2016). Adaptive control modulates the strength of a privacy filter.
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Distortion
adaptive control
image based 3 3 3 3
navigation sensors 3 3
2D kernel
isotropic 3 3 3
anisotropic 3 3
Robustness
to brute-force attack 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
to na¨ıve attack 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
to inverse filter attack 3 3 3
to super-resolution attack 3 3 3 3
to parrot attack
with detectors 3
without detectors 3 3 3
Computational simplicity 3 3 3 3
where Rmax is the dynamic range of the pixel values.
The mean square error, MSE, between the pixel in-
tensities of an unprotected, R ∈ RP , and protected,
R¯ ∈ R¯P , face is
MSE =
1
|RP |WH
|RP |∑
r=1
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
||R(w, h)− R¯(w, h)||2r,
(2)
where W and H are width and height of R, respectively.
We express the privacy level of a face region as the
accuracy η of a face recogniser (Erdelyi et al., 2014;
Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014). The value of η is the
commutative rank-n in face identification or the Equal
Error rate (EER) in face verification. We consider in
this paper face verification, thus
η =
TP + TN
|RP | , (3)
where TP and TN are true positives and true negatives,
respectively. Our target is to force a face recogniser of
an attacker to have the accuracy of random classifier,
which for face verification is  = 0.5.
We therefore aim to design FΩj that irreversibly but
minimally distorts the appearance of R so that the iden-
tity is not recognisable with a probability higher than
a random guess. If E(w, h) = FΩj (R(w, h)) − R(w, h),
the ideal distortion parameter, Ωoj , should be derived
as:
Ωoj = arg min
Ωj
(
1
WH
W∑
w=1
H∑
h=1
E(w, h) + (P (FΩj (R)|B)− 0.5)
)
,
(4)
where B ∈ {RG , R¯G , RˆG}. The first term aims to in-
troduce a minimal distortion, whereas the second term
leads the classification results to be equivalent to that of
a random classifier, irrespective of whether the filtered
or reconstructed face is compared against the unpro-
tected, filtered or reconstructed gallery data sets. The
second term objective is dependent upon the recogni-
tion capability of a face recogniser and is heuristically
addressed for a given face recogniser (Chriskos et al.,
2016; Erde´lyi et al., 2017; Pittaluga and Koppal, 2017).
The content of R should be protected against na¨ıve-
T, parrot-T and reconstruction attacks. Let an attacker
have access to B ∈ {RG , R¯G , RˆG}, where R¯G is the fil-
tered gallery data set and RˆG is the filtered and recon-
structed gallery data set. An attacker can modify R¯P ,
RG , or both, to correctly predict K˜ of R¯P . In a na¨ıve
attack (here referred to as na¨ıve-T attack), a privacy
filter is applied on RP to generate a protected probe
data set R¯P , while the unaltered RG is used for train-
ing (Newton et al., 2005). A parrot attack (here referred
to as parrot-T attack), learns the privacy filter type and
its parameters Ωj (e.g. Gaussian blur of certain stan-
dard deviation used to generate R¯P). Then, the learned
filter is applied on RG to generate a privacy protected
gallery data set R¯G . Finally, R¯G and R¯P are used for
training and testing, respectively (Newton et al., 2005).
In a reconstruction attack, the discriminating features
of R¯P are first restored (e.g. using an inverse filter or a
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super-resolution algorithm) to generate a reconstructed
probe data set RˆP and then compared against RG or a
reconstructed gallery data set RˆG . An inverse filter first
estimates the parameters of a privacy filter using R¯P
and then performs an inverse operation to reconstruct
the original faces (Kundur and Hatzinakos, 1996). Sim-
ilarly, a super-resolution algorithm first learns embed-
dings between the high-resolution and their correspond-
ing low-resolution faces and then reconstructs the high-
resolution faces for R¯P (Dong et al., 2016).
4 Proposed Approach
In order to minimally distort R as well as to achieve
robustness against brute-force, na¨ıve-T, parrot-T and
reconstruction attacks, we propose the Adaptive Hop-
ping Gaussian Mixture Model (AHGMM) algorithm.
The AHGMM consists of a globally estimated optimal
Gaussian Point Spread Function (PSF) and supplemen-
tary Gaussian PSFs added inside the optimal Gaussian
PSF. For a single supplementary Gaussian PSF inside
an optimal Gaussian PSF, the AHGMM is illustrated
in Fig. 3, while the pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1.
A list of important notations is presented in Appendix
7.
Figure 1 shows the processing diagram of our pro-
posed framework and the different blocks of it are ex-
plained in more details in the following subsections.
4.1 Pixel Density Estimation
Let an MAV capture an image I while flying at an al-
titude of h1 meters. Let the principal axis P of its on-
board camera be tilted by θP from the nadir direction
N (see Figure 4). We assume that height h1 and tilt
angle θP of the camera can be estimated.
A value of θP 6= 0 generates an oblique image. Let h2
be the height of the face above ground1. We represent
the face region in the image as R ∈ Rk ⊂ D, which is
viewed at an angle θR.
Let ρj represent the pixel density (px/cm) around
the centre CR of R. If ph and pv represent the physi-
cal dimensions of a pixel in the horizontal and vertical
direction, respectively and f is the focal length of the
camera, the horizontal density ρh for a pixel around CR
(Sarwar et al., 2016) is
ρh =
fcos(θR)
ph(h1 − h2) , (5)
1 While each image I could contain L faces, for simplicity
we consider in this paper only the case L = 1.
  
*
****
Fig. 3: Visualisation of local filtering in AHGMM. The
face region R is divided into N sub-regions and each
sub-region Rn is convolved (∗) with a hopping Gaussian
mixture model kernel Mn, which is made by an opti-
mal Gaussian function and one (or more) supplemen-
tary Gaussian function added inside the optimal Gaus-
sian function. While convolving with each sub-region of
the face, the optimal and the supplementary Gaussian
functions change their parameters, i.e. mean and stan-
dard deviation, which consequently changes the shape
of the Gaussian mixture model based kernel.
and the vertical density ρv, by exploiting the small an-
gle approximation for a single pixel of the image sensor
(Sarwar et al., 2016), is
ρv ≈ fcos(θR)sin(θR)
pv(h1 − h2) . (6)
Let ωR ∈ {0, 1} define whether R is naturally protected
(ωR = 0) because of a low horizontal and vertical den-
sity, or not (ωR = 1) (Sarwar et al., 2016):
ωR =
{
1 if ρh > ρ
o
h and ρv > ρ
o
v
0 otherwise
(7)
where ρoh and ρ
o
v are pixel densities at which a state-
of-the-art machine algorithm starts recognising human
faces, and simply called thresholds. If ωR = 0, then
the original frame I can be transmitted without any
modifications. Otherwise, R should be protected by a
privacy filter to reduce its pixel densities below ρoh and
ρov. When R is not inherently protected, we assume that
the corresponding bounding box is given.
4.2 Optimal Gaussian PSF
A 2D PSF g(h, v), or impulse response, is the output of
a filter when the input is a point source. In the discrete
domain (Oppenheim et al., 1996), it is given as g(h, v) =
δ(h, v)∗g(h, v), where ∗ is the convolution operation and
δ(h, v) =
{
1 if h = v = 0,
0 otherwise.
(8)
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Algorithm 1 AHGMM
Input: I unprotected image
R detected face region
ρj pixel density, where j ∈ {h, v}
Output: Ip protected image
1: procedure FilterAHGMM(I, R, ρh, ρv)
2: for j = h : v do
3: µoj ← 0
4: σoj ← 3ρjpiρo
j
5: end for
6: R← N sub-regions of R
7: for n = 1 : N do
8: for m = 0 : M do
9: for j = h : v do
10: if m = 0 then
11: µjm ← ±αjmσoj
12: σjm ← (1± βjm)σoj
13: else
14: µjm ← ±αjmσoj γjm
15: σjm ← (1± βjm)σoj γjm
16: end if
17: end for
18: Xn ← (µjm, σjm)n
19: Gnm ← compute Gaussian functions
20: φnm ← generate weights
21: end for
22: Mn ← Gaussian mixture model
23: R¯n ← Rn ∗Mn
24: end for
25: R¯← apply global filter on R¯
26: Ip ← replace R with R¯ in I
27: return Ip
28: end procedure
In the case of Gaussian blur, g(h, v) is an approxi-
mated Gaussian function of mean µj = 0 and standard
deviation σj > 0 (Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014; Saini
et al., 2012; Sarwar et al., 2016), and thus called a Gaus-
sian PSF of parameter Ωj = (µj , σj). More specifically,
the parameter Ωj ∈ {Ωjl|l ∈ N, Ωjl+1 > Ωjl} controls
the distortion strength of FΩj and provides pixel den-
sity ρj ∈ {ρjl|l ∈ N, ρjl+1 < ρjl} in R¯, respectively.
As a higher Ωj results into lower ρj , we first find
the minimum value called optimal parameter Ωoj of Ωj
that makes ρj < ρ
o
j . As a result, Ω
o
j provides the min-
imum distortion in R¯ while making it robust against
the na¨ıve-T attack (i.e. P (R¯|RG) → ). Increasing Ωj
beyond Ωoj increases the distortion without improving
the privacy level as the recogniser performance is al-
ready at the level of the random classifier. For a face
captured from an MAV with pixel densities ρj , we cal-
culate Ωoj = (µ
o
j , σ
o
j ) of an optimal Gaussian PSF (lines
2-5 in Algorithm 1), where µoj = 0 like in traditional
Gaussian blur (Korshunov and Ebrahimi, 2014; Saini
et al., 2012; Sarwar et al., 2016) and σoj (Sarwar et al.,
2016) is estimated as follows:
A Gaussian PSF of standard deviation σoj in the spa-
tial domain is another Gaussian PSF of standard devia-
  
.
Scrambling
Blanking
Blur
AHGMM
Note: please use the blank and blank1 projects in Eclipse
Fig. 4: Capturing an image with an airborne camera at
height h1. The principal axis P of the camera is tilted
by θP from the nadir direction N . The face region R,
at height h2 above the ground, is viewed at an angle
θR. The variables ρh and ρv represent the horizontal
and vertical pixel density of R at its centre CR in the
captured image. Four sample images show a scrambled,
blanked, Gaussian blurred and AHGMM filtered image,
which is captured at θP = θR = 50
◦.
tion σ´oj in the frequency domain and both the Gaussian
PSFs are related as
σ´oj =
ρj
2piσoj
, (9)
where σ´oj is measured in cycles/cm, σ
o
j in px and ρj in
px/cm. Let fs represents the Nyquist frequency of ρj .
Let fos < fs is the highest spatial frequency component
that we want to completely remove using a low pass fil-
ter, i.e. Gaussian blur. In other words, fos is the Nyquist
frequency of ρoj , i.e. pixel density after filtering. Both
ρoj and f
o
s are related as
ρoj = 2f
o
s . (10)
As we are interested in removing frequency components
beyond fos , we can select f
o
s = 3σ´
o
j because the am-
plitude response of a Gaussian PSF at three times of
its standard deviation is very close to zero and mul-
tiplication (convolution in space domain) with such a
Gaussian PSF will suppress frequencies larger than fos .
Substituting fos = 3σ´
o
j in Eq. 10, in the resulting re-
lation Eq. 9 and finally rearranging gives the optimal
standard deviation of Gaussian PSF as
σoj =
3ρj
piρoj
. (11)
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4.3 Hopping GMM Kernels
Filtering R with the optimal Gaussian PSF defined by
Ωoj would only protect R from a na¨ıve-T attack but not
from a parrot-T attack and a reconstruction attack. To
ensure that the probability of correctly predicting the
label of R¯ is not increased in case of the parrot-T attack
(i.e. P (R¯|R¯G)→ ) as well as the reconstruction attack
(i.e. P (Rˆ|RG)→  or P (Rˆ|RˆG)→ ), we secretly mod-
ify Ωoj to Ω¯
o
j while generating R¯ so that an adversary is
unable to accurately reconstruct face region Rˆ, or even
generate RˆG and R¯G . For this purpose, we generate a
set R which consists of N sub-regions in such a way
that each sub-region covers a small area of R:
R =
{
Rn|n ∈ [1, N ]
}
. (12)
The size of Rn (in pixels) affects the total number of
sub-regions N per face region R, which could influ-
ence its privacy level. Smaller values of N (larger sub-
regions) result in a reduced distortion.
After finding Ωoj = (µ
o
j , σ
o
j ) and generating R, we
make a hopping mixture of Gaussian for each sub-region,
i.e. we pseudo-randomly change Ωoj to Ω¯
o
j for each Rn.
Moreover, we select supplementary Gaussian PSFs in-
side this optimal Gaussian PSF and vary their param-
eters based on pseudo-random weights (lines 9-17 in
Algorithm 1).
Let set X contains the parameters of the modified
optimal and supplementary Gaussian PSFs for each
sub-region, and is represented as
X =
{
(µjm, σjm)n|n ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ {h, v},m ∈ [0,M ]
}
,
(13)
where M is the number of the supplementary Gaus-
sian PSFs. The element m = 0 represents the modified
optimal Gaussian PSF given by
µj0 = ±αj0σoj , (14)
σj0 = (1± βj0)σoj , (15)
while the remaining elements (i.e. m ∈ (0,M ]) belong
to the supplementary Gaussian PSFs. These elements
are calculated as
µjm = ±αjmσojγjm, (16)
σjm = (1± βjm)σojγjm, (17)
where, αjm ∈ [0, 1] and βjm ∈ [0, 1] are normalised
pseudo-randomly generated numbers and control the
local distortion in filtering. The variable γjm ∈ (0, 1]
controls the relative size of the supplementary Gaussian
PSF w.r.t. the optimal Gaussian PSF.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5: Minimising blocking artefacts of spatially hop-
ping Gaussian functions in AHGMM filter by a convo-
lution with a global kernel. (a) Original image of 96×96
pixels from the LFW data set, (b) image after local fil-
tering in AHGMM showing blocking artefacts and (c)
image after the local filtering followed by the global fil-
tering in AHGMM.
After generating the parameters of the Gaussian
PSFs, a set G representing 2D anisotropic-discretised
Gaussian PSFs corresponding to X is created as
G =
{
Gnm|n ∈ [1, N ],m ∈ [0,M ]
}
, (18)
where each Gnm is calculated (line 19 in Algorithm 1)
as (Popkin et al., 2010)
Gnm ≈ Anme
−
(
(h−µhnm)2
2σ2
hnm
+
(v−µvnm)2
2σ2vnm
)
, (19)
where
Anm = 1
/ ∑
(h,v)∈d
e
−
(
(h−µhnm)2
2(σhnm)
2 +
(v−µvnm)2
2(σvnm)2
)
, (20)
and
d =
{
(h, v) ∈ Z2 :
⌈
−ψh
2
⌉
≤ h ≤
⌈
ψh
2
⌉
,
⌈
−ψv
2
⌉
≤ v ≤
⌈
ψv
2
⌉}
,
(21)
with ψj = 2
⌈
3σj
⌉
+ 1. In order to develop a mixture
model from the M discretised Gaussian PSFs of each
sub-region, a set of weights φ is required. We again
utilise a PRNG to generate φ such that
φ =
{
φnm|n ∈ [1, N ],m ∈ [0,M ],
M∑
m=0
φnm = 1
}
. (22)
Finally, a set of mixture models is generated for each
sub-region (line 22 in Algorithm 1) as
M =
{
Mn|n ∈ [1, N ]
}
, (23)
where each element is calculated as
Mn =
M∑
m=0
φnmGnm. (24)
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(6.21, 4.63) (6.21, 4.56) (3.11, 2.17) (3.11, 2.00) (1.55, 0.89) (1.55, 0.74) (0.78, 0.29) (0.78, 0.20)
(a)
(b) ρ0h = ρ
0
v = 0.7 px/cm
(c) ρ0h = ρ
0
v = 0.5 px/cm
(d) ρ0h = ρ
0
v = 0.3 px/cm
Fig. 6: Visual comparison between fixed Gaussian blur
(FGB), AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) and AHGMM on
the multi-resolution synthetically generated face data
set. (a) Original images with pixel densities decreas-
ing from left to right due different height and pitch
angle. (.,.) indicates the horizontal and vertical pixel
density in px/cm, respectively. (b-d) For various thresh-
olds (ρoh, ρ
o
v), results of FGB (first row), AGB (second
row) and AHGMM filter (third row). For each thresh-
old, FGB is selected w.r.t. the highest pixel density im-
age in the data set. FGB does not adapt its parameters
and therefore results into almost blanking out the image
with smaller pixel density. In contrast, both AGB and
AHGMM maintain high smoothness by varying their
parameters depending upon the pixel densities of an im-
age. Comparatively, AGB produces smoother images,
while AHGMM filter creates blocking artefacts due to
spatial switching of its parameters.
4.4 Local and Global Filtering
We have now N discretised Gaussian mixture models
inM for N sub-regions of R. We locally convolve each
sub-region Rn (Eq. 12) with their respective Mn to
make a protected sub-region R¯n:
R¯ =
{
R¯n|n ∈ [1, N ]
}
, (25)
where R¯n = Rn ∗Mn. Changing the convolutional ker-
nel for each sub-region generates blocking artefacts (see
Fig. 5). To smooth these artefacts, we apply a global
convolution filter (line 25 in Algorithm 1) with a Gaus-
sian kernel of zero mean and standard deviation
σ¯j =
σoj
Qj
, (26)
where Qj represents the sub-region size in pixels. As a
result, a smoothed protected face R¯ is developed which
is replaced in the captured image I to generate a privacy
protected image Ip. Fig. 6 shows few sample images
filtered by AHGMM at different thresholds.
4.5 Computational Complexity
The generation of a convolutional kernel is more com-
plex in AHGMM than in the adaptive Gaussian blur
filter (Sarwar et al., 2016). In fact, the latter only needs
to compute a single Gaussian function, while AHGMM
requires the computation of N ·M Gaussian functions.
Moreover, the adaptive Gaussian blur exploits the sep-
arability property of 2D convolutional kernels, i.e. ψ =
ψh∗ψv, to reduce the number of multiplications and ad-
ditions from W ·H · |ψh| · |ψv| to W ·H ·(|ψh| + |ψv|) (W
and H represent the width and height of R in pixels,
respectively). Instead, AHGMM dynamically reconfig-
ures the convolutional kernel after processing each sub-
region and therefore requires exactly W ·H · |ψh| · |ψv|
multiplications and additions.
5 Dataset Generation
To the best of our knowledge, there is no large pub-
licly available face dataset collected from an MAV. We
therefore generate face images as if they were captured
from an MAV via geometric transformation and down-
sampling of the LFW dataset (Huang et al., 2007). The
LFW dataset was collected in an unconstrained envi-
ronment with extreme illumination conditions and ex-
treme poses. We use the standard verification bench-
mark test of the LFW dataset (12000 images of 4281
subjects), divided into 10-folds for cross-validation. Each
fold contains 600 images of the same subject and 600
images of different subjects. We use the deep funnelled
version of the LFW dataset.
Figure 8 shows sample images of the stages of the
dataset generation pipeline. We fit a 3D Morphable
Model (3DMM) (Bas et al., 2016) on an input image to
detect 68 facial landmarks (Zhu and Ramanan, 2012)
and then iteratively fit a 3DMM to generate a 3D im-
age representation2. As there may be only a few de-
grees pitch of the subject captured in the images (e.g. a
2 Among the 12000 images, the landmark detector (Zhu
and Ramanan, 2012) was unable to detect 68 facial landmarks
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(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Sample images belonging to (a) a single subject and (b) multiple subjects from our synthetically generated
airborne data set based on the LFW data set (Huang et al., 2007). In each row, the pitch angle varies from 0◦
to 70◦ in 10◦ steps from left to right, while the image resolution remains constant, i.e. first row: 96 × 96 pixels,
second row: 48× 48 pixels, third row: 24× 24 pixels, fourth row: 12× 12 pixels and fifth row: 6× 6 pixels.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 8: Sample images at different stages during the
data set generation process. (a) Original image 250×250
pixels, (b) image after fitting a 3D morphable model at
0◦ pitch angle, (c) image with synthetic pitch effect pro-
duced by applying a 3D geometric transformation, (d)
aligned image of 96×96 pixels produced by applying an
affine transformation computed by detecting eyes and
nose location and (e) down-sampled image emulating
an image captured at a different height.
person looking slightly downward or upward), we ro-
tate the 3D image at 0◦ pitch by applying a geometric
transformation computed from the estimated pose of
the fitted 3DMM. This disturbs the image alignment of
the original data set, so a realignment is required, which
we perform after generating the pitch effect. The syn-
thetic pitch angles start from 0◦ to 70◦ with a step size
of 10◦ and project it back to generate a corresponding
2D image. In order to align this image so that the eyes
and nose appear at the same place among the images
belonging to the same pitch angle, we apply an affine
transformation computed by detecting eyes and nose
tip using Dlib library (King, 2009) such that the trans-
formed face has a resolution of 96 × 96 pixels. As the
detection accuracy of the eyes and nose decrease with
increasing pitch angle, we generate a ground truth (lo-
on 74 images. Therefore, we were unable to fit a 3DMM and
used the original 74 images in order to comply with the stan-
dard verification test script of the LFW data set.
cation of eyes and nose tip) of the 0◦ pitch angle images
and uses it for the higher pitch angle images.
Finally, to introduce different height effects for the 8
synthetically generated images, we down-sample them
with a factor of 2, 4, 8 and 16 generating images of
48×48, 24×24, 12×12, 6×6 pixels, respectively. Thus,
we increase the size of the original standard verification
test of the LFW data set by 40 times, i.e. from 12000
images to 480, 000 images. Fig. 7 shows the 40 sample
images belonging to the same and different subjects.
We manually determined the values of ρh and ρv by
ρh = Sc/Sh, (27)
ρv = Sccos(γ)/Sv, (28)
where Sc is the cropped face size in pixels, γ = 90
◦ −
θR is the pitch angle of the image and Sh and Sv are
the average human face dimensions, i.e. the bitragion
breadth of 15.45 cm and menton-crinion length of 20.75
cm, respectively (DoD, 2000).
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Experimental Set up
We compare AHGMM against Space Variant Gaussian
Blur (SVGB) (Saini et al., 2012), Adaptive Gaussian
Blur (AGB) (Sarwar et al., 2016) and Fixed Gaussian
Blur (FGB), which uses a constant Gaussian kernel de-
fined with respect to the highest resolution face. Thus,
we estimate the kernel for FGB as in (Sarwar et al.,
2016) for the face with 96× 96 pixels at 0◦ pitch angle.
For the SVGB filter, we divide the face into four con-
centric circles and reduce the kernel size by 5% while
radially moving out between two consecutive regions as
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in (Saini et al., 2012). Although the kernel for the in-
nermost region was manually selected in the original
work, we choose the anisotropic kernel as estimated by
the AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) and convert it into an
isotropic kernel for a fair comparison. We use a block
size of 4× 4 and m = 1 for the AHGMM.
To compare privacy filters, we measure the face ver-
fication accuracy using OpenFace (Amos et al., 2016),
an open source implementation of Google’s face recogni-
tion algorithm FaceNet (Schroff et al., 2015). OpenFace
uses a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) as a
feature extractor, which is trained by a large face data
set (500k images). This feature extractor is applied on
the training and test images for their representations
(embeddings) which are used for classification (Schroff
et al., 2015).
To measure distortion as in (Erdelyi et al., 2014;
Nawaz and Ferryman, 2015), we apply the PSNR, the
power ratio of the original image with respect to the
filtered image.
We perform experiments with 480,000 images (con-
sisting of 5 different resolutions and 8 different pitch an-
gles) to determine the validity of the proposed AHGMM
to protect the identity information of an individual.
For this purpose, we analyse the effect of a na¨ıve-T
attack, a parrot-T attack, an inverse filter attack and a
super-resolution attack. Moreover, we quantify the cor-
responding fidelity degradation caused by the AHGMM.
As AGB and SVGB do not use any secret key, we
evaluate them only using their accurate parameters in
the parrot-T, inverse filter and super-resolution attacks.
In contrast, any of these attacks on AHGMM can be
further divided into three sub-attacks: optimal kernel,
pseudo AHGMM and accurate AHGMM. In the opti-
mal kernel sub-attack, we assume that an attacker is
able to estimate the parameters of the optimal kernel
and applies the optimal kernel to the entire face. In
the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the
attacker knows the optimal kernel and randomly mod-
ifies the filter parameter for the N sub-regions. In the
accurate AHGMM sub-attack, we assume that the at-
tacker has access to the secret key and can decipher all
filter parameters for the N sub-regions. As this prior-
knowledge can be exploited for both probe and gallery
images, we therefore evaluate AHGMM under 13 dif-
ferent scenarios stated in Table 2.
We assume that an attacker is able to determine the
pitch angle of a protected face using the background
information of an image captured from an MAV and
can apply a geometric transformation to transform the
gallery images at that pitch angle. Therefore, in all the
following attacks, both the gallery and the probe images
are at the same pitch angle which can be protected or
Table 2: Attacks used to evaluate the privacy level
of the proposed AHGMM algorithm. Both the gallery
faces and the probe faces can be protected or unpro-
tected (na¨ıve-BL). Moreover, the protected faces could
be either unchanged or reconstructed (e.g. through an
inverse-filter (IF) or super-resolution (SR)). Finally,
any AHGMM attack could be further divided into three
sub-attacks corresponding to the prior-knowledge of an
attacker: optimal, pseudo and accurate.
Gallery images
unprotected protected
unchanged reconstructed
IF SR
P
ro
b
e
im
a
g
es
u
n
p
ro
te
ct
ed
na¨ıve-BL N/A N/A N/A
p
ro
te
ct
ed
u
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
na¨ıve-T
parrot-T
- optimal
- pseudo
- accurate
— —
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed I
F
na¨ıve-IF
-optimal
-pseudo
-accurate
—
parrot-IF
-accurate
—
S
R
na¨ıve-SR
-optimal
-pseudo
-accurate
— —
parrot-SR
-accurate
unprotected depending upon the attack type. Moreover,
we use the same resolution for both the gallery images
and the probe images.
6.2 Na¨ıve-T Attack
First of all, we perform a na¨ıve-BL attack which shows
the baseline face verfication accuracy when both the
probe data set and the gallery data set are unprotected.
The results of the na¨ıve-BL attack are given in Fig. 9.
After that we perform a na¨ıve-T attack in which the
gallery images are unprotected, while the probe images
are protected using FGB, SVGB (Saini et al., 2012),
AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) and AHGMM. The results
of this attack are given in Fig. 10 at different thresholds
ρoj .
The na¨ıve-BL attack shows that the accuracy η of
our synthetically generated data set decreases with the
decrease of the face resolution and with the increase
in the face pitch angle. However, this trend vanishes
at high pitch angles, i.e. 60◦ and 70◦, where it shows
slight randomness. Finally, for the low resolution faces
(6 × 6 pixels), the accuracy does not show any effect
of the pitch angle and slightly oscillates. Therefore, we
consider 6 × 6 pixels inherently privacy protected and
remove these images from the analysis of the privacy
filters.
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Fig. 9: Face verification accuracy η of a na¨ıve-BL attack
on our synthetically generated face data set. In general,
η increases with increasing the face size except at high
pitch angles of 60 and 70 degrees where it slightly fluc-
tuates randomly. For 6× 6 pixels faces, η is the lowest
and rather independent of the pitch angle.
From the na¨ıve-T attack, we are interested in finding
the optimal threshold which defines the optimal kernel
for AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) (see Section 4 and Eq.
11). It is clear from Fig. 10 that the accuracy of the
na¨ıve-T attack decreases while decreasing the thresh-
old. When the threshold reaches 0.5 px/cm, the differ-
ence between the accuracy achieved by AGB (Sarwar
et al., 2016) and a random classifier (η = 0.5) becomes
very small except, unexpectedly, at high pitch angles.
This difference further decreases at 0.4 px/cm and 0.3
px/cm. Thus, the optimal threshold defining the opti-
mal kernel can be 0.5 px/cm, 0.4 px/cm and 0.3 px/cm.
The later two thresholds decreases the accuracy neg-
ligibly but distort the images severely. Therefore, we
decide to perform a trade-off analysis of the accuracy
(under na¨ıve, parrot attack and reconstruction attacks)
and the distortion at these three thresholds.
At these three thresholds under the na¨ıve-T attack,
the accuracy of the AHGMM is higher as compared
to the AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016). The main reason for
this slightly higher accuracy is due to the under blurred
sub-regions of the AHGMM filtered face as it hops its
kernel below and above the optimal Gaussian kernel.
In contrast, the accuracy of the Space Variant Gaus-
sian Blur (Saini et al., 2012) is always lower than AGB
and AHGMM. This is because SVGB uses an isotropic
Gaussian kernel which deteriorates a face more severely
as compared to the anisotropic kernel of the AGB and
AHGMM filter. FGB possess the lowest accuracy at
any threshold due to over blurring of all images except
96× 96 pixels images at 0◦ pitch angle.
6.3 Parrot-T Attack
In the parrot-T attack, we filter both gallery and probe
images and then evaluate the achieved accuracy. We
study the parrot-T attack on AHGMM under three sub-
attacks: optimal kernel parrot-T sub-attack, pseudo AHGMM
parrot-T sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-T
sub-attack. The accuracy results of these sub-attacks
are given in Fig. 10 at different thresholds ρoj , while
Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate
AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack at ρoj = 0.5 px/cm are
presented in Fig. 11.
The parrot-T attack on state-of-the-art privacy fil-
ters increases the accuracy as compared to the na¨ıve-
T attack. Under the optimal kernel parrot sub-attack,
our AHGMM shows the least accuracy improvement at
any of the three thresholds. This is because the optimal
kernel Gaussian blur is a spatially invariant blur that
is not helpful in recognising spatially varying Gaussian
blurred images, e.g. the AHGMM filtered images. Thus,
our AHGMM provides the lowest accuracy against the
parrot-T attack using the optimal kernel.
The pseudo AHGMM parrot-T sub-attack slightly
improves the accuracy further as compared to the op-
timal kernel parrot-T sub-attack. The main reason is
that both the gallery and the probe images are now fil-
tered using spatially varying Gaussian blur. However,
under the pseudo AHGMM sub-attack, the accuracy of
AHGMM remains below the other three state-of-the-art
privacy filters. Thus, our AHGMM provides the highest
privacy protection even against the pseudo AHGMM
parrot sub-attack.
Finally, the accurate AHGMM sub-attack improves
the accuracy as compared to the optimal kernel and
almost eqivalent to the pseudo AHGMM sub-attacks.
Comparatively, even under the accurate AHGMM sub-
attack, AHGMM performs better than FGB, AGB (Sar-
war et al., 2016) and SVGB (Saini et al., 2012) at these
three thresholds with the least improvement at ρoj = 0.3
px/cm.
From the accurate AHGMM sub-attack, it is appar-
ent that our AHGMM permanently removes the sensi-
tive information from the face and an attacker can not
recognise it with a high accuracy even when he/she has
access to the secret key. This is in contrast to the re-
versible filters, e.g. encryption/scrambling based filters,
which can reconstruct the original face after having the
secret key. Thus, our AHGMM is robust against the
brute-force attack.
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Fig. 10: Face verification accuracy η achieved by na¨ıve and parrot attacks on images protected by four different
privacy protection filters at different thresholds ρoj : first row: ρ
o
j = 0.7 px/cm, second row: ρ
o
j = 0.6 px/cm, third
row: ρoj = 0.5 px/cm, fourth row: ρ
o
j = 0.4 px/cm, fifth row: ρ
o
j = 0.3 px/cm. The filled marker shows the mean
and the vertical bar indicates the standard deviation of η for the multi-resolution images (96×96, 48×48, 24×24,
12× 12). Legend:— AHGMM,— AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016),— SVGB (Saini et al., 2012),— FGB.
Under the na¨ıve-T attack, AHGMM posses the highest η which converges towards η = 0.5 as the ρoj is decreased
and finally at ρoj ≤ 0.5 px/cm, the difference between η of AHGMM, AGB, SVGB and FGB becomes negligible,
except unexpectedly at pitch angles 60◦ and 70◦ degrees. The parrot-T attack on AHGMM is divided into three
sub-attacks: optimal kernel parrot-T attack, pseudo AHGMM parrot-T attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-T
attack. In contrast to na¨ıve-T attack, AHGMM provides the lowest η under any type of the three parrot-T attacks
and this fact becomes negligible at ρoj = 0.3 px/cm under accurate AHGMM parrot-T attack.
6.4 Inverse Filter Attack
In the inverse-filter (IF) attack, we reconstruct the probe
images by deconvolving the protected face with an ac-
curate or estimated kernel. We evaluate the IF attack
under four sub-attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF sub-
attack, pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-IF sub-attack, accurate
AHGMM na¨ıve-IF sub-attack and accurate AHGMM
parrot-IF sub-attack. Fig. 12 depicts the effect of in-
verse filtering on selected sample images protected with
AGB, SVGB and AHGMM. Fig. 13 shows the achieved
accuracies under the different sub-attacks at different
values of ρoj , while Fig. 14 presents ROCs for the accu-
rate AHGMM parrot-IF sub-attack at ρoj = 0.5 px/cm.
As can be seen in Fig. 12, the face reconstruction
quality decreases when the threshold increases (increas-
ing the filter kernel) even if the filter parameters are
known. This is true for both space invariant Gaussian
blur (AGB) and linear space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB).
The main reason is that the boundaries of the face start
propagating towards the center of the face as the thresh-
old is decreased. Thus, it becomes difficult to distin-
guish between reconstructed faces at the lower thresh-
olds (see Fig. 13).
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Fig. 11: Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate AHGMM parrot-T attack at threshold ρoj = 0.5
px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves generated by the 10-folds used for cross validation. Legend:—
Unprotected,— AGB,— SVGB,— FGB,— AHGMM. In each column, the image resolution remains
constant, i.e. first column: 96 × 96, second column: 48 × 48, third column: 24 × 24 and fourth column: 12 × 12
pixels, while the pitch angle varies i.e. first row: 0◦, second row: 10◦, third row: 20◦, fourth row: 30◦, fifth row: 40◦,
sixth row: 50◦, seventh row: 60◦ and eighth row: 70◦. The legend values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
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Fig. 12: Inverse filtering of protected faces at differ-
ent thresholds ρoj . AGB and SVGB protected faces can
be reconstructed by inverse filtering to some extent. In-
verse filtering of AHGMM protected faces is hardly pos-
sible even if the hopping kernel parameters are known.
In case of non-linear space variant blur (AHGMM),
the reconstruction becomes more challenging even when
the same hopping kernels are used as for the protection.
The main reason, in addition to the boundary propaga-
tion, is that while deconvolving a sub-region, the IF in-
correctly treats the adjacent subregions as if they were
filtered with the same kernel, thus not enabling it to re-
construct the original face (see Fig 12). Consequently,
it becomes difficult to accurately predict the label of
the reconstructed face.
In contrast to na¨ıve-IF attacks, parrot-IF attack is
more severe and increases significantly the accuracy,
especially for AGB, FGB and SVGB. AHGMM also
shows the accuracy improvement but less than AGB,
FGB and SVGB; and is more robust to an inverse filter
attack even when using an accurate secret key.
6.5 Super-resolution Attack
In this attack, we reconstruct the filtered probe images
with SRCNN (Dong et al., 2016). SRCNN first learns a
mapping between the high-resolution images and their
corresponding low-resolution version, and then applies
this mapping to enhance the details of a low-resolution
image. We learn the SRCNN mapping for 1, 000, 000
iterations between the protected images (i.e. the low
resolution) and their corresponding unprotected images
(i.e. the high resolution) using the same data sets (91-
images and Set5) as used in (Dong et al., 2016). As
learning of the mapping is a time consuming process,
we investigate the super-resolution attack for a single
point of our synthetic data set: 12000 images each with
96× 96 pixels and 0◦ pitch angle.
We evaluate the super-resolution (SR) attack under
four sub-attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-SR sub-attack,
pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-SR sub-attack, accurate AHGMM
na¨ıve-SR sub-attack and accurate AHGMM parrot-SR
sub-attack. Tab. 3 summarises the achieved accuracies
under the different sub-attacks, while Fig. 15 presents
Table 3: Face verification accuracy η after a super-
resolution attack on faces protected by adaptive Gaus-
sian blur (AGB), space variant Gaussian blur (SVGB)
and AHGMM at threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. The values
of η are given as µ˜(σ˜), where µ˜ indicates the mean and
σ˜ the standard deviation for the 10-fold cross valida-
tions. In the na¨ıve-SR attack, the reconstructed probe
faces are compared against the unprotected gallery im-
ages, while both the probe and the gallery images are
super-resolved in the parrot-SR attack.
Attack type AGB SVGB AHGMM
optimal na¨ıve-SR 0.592 (0.012) 0.566 (0.016) 0.515 (0.014)
pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-SR – – 0.520 (0.006)
accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-SR – – 0.532 (0.018)
accurate AHGMM parrot-SR 0.634 (0.015) 0.583(0.034) 0.546 (0.018)
the ROC for the accurate AHGMM parrot-SR sub-
attack. Fig. 16 depicts a visual comparison of the super-
resolution reconstruction for three sample faces pro-
tected by AGB, SVGB and AHGMM filters.
For the space invariant Gaussian blur (AGB), it is
apparent from Fig. 16 that the SR attack can recon-
struct the faces more effectively, even when the kernel
size is quite high (i.e. ρoj = 0.5 px/cm). Therefore, the
faces protected by AGB achieves a higher accuracy (see
Tab. 3). In contrast, faces protected by linear space vari-
ant Gaussian blur (SVGB) are difficult to reconstruct.
The main reason is that the SR mapping becomes er-
roneous especially for patches which contain parts pro-
cessed by different kernels. However, SR can effectively
reconstruct patches where the Gaussian blur is locally
invariant (e.g. compare the areas around eyes of the
SVGB restored faces in Fig. 16). The overall recon-
struction is worse than for AGB and thus the achieved
accuracy is lower.
Reconstruction by super-resolution is even more chal-
lenging for AHGMM protected faces. The main reason
is that a single patch for learning the mapping contains
several sub-regions each filtered with pseudo-randomly
correlated Gaussian mixture models. Thus, the error
in the learned SR mapping increases resulting in the
lowest accuracy as compared to AGB and SVGB.
Similarly to parrot-IF attack, the accuracy improves
for the parrot-SR attack where SR-reconstruction is
also performed for the gallery images. Especially for
AGB and SVGB, the similarity between (protected and
reconstructed) gallery images and the (reconstructed)
probe images increases. Thus, the accuracy increases.
As for the other attacks, AHGMM is more robust to
parrot attacks than AGB and SVGB, and achieves the
lowest accuracy.
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Fig. 13: Face verification accuracy η achieved by an inverse filter (IF) attack on images protected by four different
privacy protection filters at different thresholds ρoj : first row: ρ
o
j = 0.7 px/cm, second row: ρ
o
j = 0.6 px/cm, third
row: ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. The filled marker shows the mean and the vertical bar indicates the standard deviation
of η for the multi-resolution images (96 × 96, 48 × 48, 24 × 24, 12 × 12). Legend:— AHGMM,— AGB,
— SVGB,— FGB. The IF attack is investigated under four sub-attacks: optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF, pseudo
AHGMM na¨ıve-IF, accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-IF and accurate AHGMM parrot-IF attack. The AHGMM achieves
a slightly higher η under the na¨ıve-IF attacks than the state-of-the-art filters, independently of the used threshold
ρoj . In contrast, AHGMM achieves the lowest η under the parrot-IF attack. As η is close to 0.5 under the na¨ıve-IF
attack for 0.5 ≤ ρoj ≤ 0.7 px/cm, we therefore do not perform experiments for ρoj < 0.5 px/cm.
6.6 Distortion Analysis
We measure the distortion of the FGB, SVGB (Saini
et al., 2012), AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) and AHGMM
using PSNR. For a trade-off analysis between distor-
tion and privacy, we plot the face verification accuracy
against PSNR. The results of this trade-off analysis are
presented in Fig. 17.
AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) has the highest average
PSNR values followed by SVGB (Saini et al., 2012),
AHGMM and FGB. The main reason is that AGB uses
a single anisotropic kernel instead of spatially linearly
varying kernel used by SVGB (Saini et al., 2012). Al-
though AHGMM also uses an anisotropic kernel like
AGB, the spatial hopping phenomena of the Gaussian
mixture model of the AHGMM results in high distor-
tion (PSNR values) as compared to AGB and SVGB
(see Fig. 6). FGB has the highest distortion as it does
not change its parameters depending upon the resolu-
tion of the face.
7 Conclusion
We presented an irreversible visual privacy protection
filter which is robust against a parrot, an inverse-filter
and a super-resolution attack that are faced by an ad-
hoc blurring of sensitive regions. The proposed filter is
based on an adaptive hopping Gaussian mixture model.
Depending upon the captured resolution of a sensitive
region, the filter globally adapts the parameters of the
Gaussian mixture model to minimise the distortion,
while locally hop them pseudo-randomly so that an at-
tacker is unable to estimate these parameters. We eval-
uated the validity of the AHGMM using a state-of-the-
art face recognition algorithm and a synthetic face data
set with faces at different pitch angles and resolutions
emulating faces as captured from an MAV. The pro-
posed algorithm provides the highest privacy level un-
der a parrot, an inverse-filter and a super-resolution at-
tack and an almost equivalent level of privacy to state-
of-the-art privacy filters under a na¨ıve attack.
Unlike face-de-identification approaches ((Chriskos
et al., 2015; Du et al., 2014; Gross et al., 2006; Letournel
et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2012; Newton et al., 2005)), we
do not depend on an auxiliary visual detector (i.e. pose,
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Fig. 14: Receiver Operating Curves (ROCs) for the accurate AHGMM parrot-IF attack at threshold ρoj = 0.5
px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves generated by the 10-folds used for cross validation. Legend:—
Unprotected,— AGB,— SVGB,— FGB,— AHGMM. In each column, the image resolution remains
constant, i.e. first column: 96 × 96, second column: 48 × 48, third column: 24 × 24 and fourth column: 12 × 12
pixels, while the pitch angle varies i.e. first row: 0◦, second row: 10◦, third row: 20◦, fourth row: 30◦, fifth row: 40◦,
sixth row: 50◦, seventh row: 60◦ and eighth row: 70◦. The legend values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
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Fig. 15: Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) for the accu-
rate AHGMM parrot-SR attack at threshold ρoj = 0.5
px/cm. Each ROC is the mean of 10-curves gener-
ated by the 10-folds used for cross validation. Leg-
end:— Unprotected,— AGB,— SVGB,—
AHGMM. This test is performed only for a single reso-
lution (96× 96 pixels) and pitch anfle (0◦). The legend
values represent the Area Under Curve (AUC).
Original
AGB SVGB AHGMM
filtered restored filtered restored filtered restored
optimal pseudo accurate
Fig. 16: Visual comparison of reconstructed faces with
super-resolution algorithm SRCNN (Dong et al., 2016)
for threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm. Reconstruction perfor-
mance deteriorates from AGB (Sarwar et al., 2016) over
SVGB (Saini et al., 2012) to AHGMM protected faces.
facial expression, age, gender, race) to counter a par-
rot, an inverse-filter or a super-resolution attack. More-
over, unlike the encryption/scrambling filters ((Baaziz
et al., 2007; Boult, 2005; Chattopadhyay and Boult,
2007; Dufaux and Ebrahimi, 2006, 2008; Korshunov and
Ebrahimi, 2013a,b; Rahman et al., 2010; Sohn et al.,
2011; Winkler and Rinner, 2011)), AHGMM prevents
the recovery of the original face even with access to the
seed of the PRNG.
We will make available to the research community
the face dataset of 4281 subjects we generated to emu-
late faces captured from an MAV under varying poses
and illumination conditions.
All the symbols used in the paper along with their mean-
ings are summarised in Table 4.
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Fig. 17: Trade-off analysis between the Face verifica-
tion accuracy η and the distortion provided by the dif-
ferent privacy filters under the na¨ıve-T, parrot-T and
inverse filter (IF) attacks at threshold ρoj = 0.5 px/cm.
The distortion is measured by the Peak Signal to Noise
Ratio (PSNR). Legend:— AHGMM,— AGB
(Sarwar et al., 2016),— SVGB (Saini et al., 2012),
— FGB. Under the na¨ıve-T attack, our proposed
AHGMM possesses η almost equivalent to the state-
of-the-art filter, but lowest under the parrot-T attacks.
However, AHGMM has slightly lower PSNR as com-
pared to AGB and SVGB, but much higher than FGB.
(a) na¨ıve-T attack, (b) accurate AHGMM parrot-IF
attack, (c) optimal kernel na¨ıve-IF attack, (d) opti-
mal kernel parrot-T attack, (e) pseudo AHGMM na¨ıve-
IF attack, (f) pseudo AHGMM parrot-T attack, (g)
accurate AHGMM na¨ıve-IF attack and (h) accurate
AHGMM parrot-T attack. For the last three na¨ıve-IF
and parrot-T attacks, the results of AGB, SVGB and
FGB are the same and have been superimposed for the
comparison. Please see Section 6.2, Section 6.3 and Sec-
tion 6.4 for the details of the attacks.
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Table 4: List of notations.
Notation Meaning
R, R¯, Rˆ unprotected, protected and reconstructed face region
CR centre of R
W,H width and height of R
D A data set including both gallery and probe data sets
RG , R¯G , RˆG unprotected, protected and reconstructed gallery data set
RP , R¯P , RˆP unprotected, protected and reconstructed probe data set
K, K˜ original and predicted identity labels
FΩj a privacy filter of parameter Ωj
G a function that an attacker exploits
D distortion introduced by FΩj
P probability of predicting the label of a face
η face verification accuracy
 verification accuracy of a random classifier
f focal length of the camera
pj physical dimension of a pixel in j direction
h1, h2 height of a camera and face from ground level
N,P vectors representing Nadir and principal axis of a camera
θR, θP angle between N , R and N , P
N Number of sub-regions of R
M Number of supplementary Gaussian functions
ρj pixel density (px/cm), where j ∈ {h, v}
ρoj threshold pixel density for privacy filtering
µj , σj mean and standard deviation of a Gaussian PSF
µoj , σ
o
j mean and standard deviation of an optimal Gaussian PSF
µjm, σjm randomly modified µoj and σ
o
j for m
th Gaussian PSF
αjm, βjm randomly generated numbers for µjm and σjm
Ωj , Ωoj , Ω¯
o
j a tuple (µj , σj), (µ
o
j , σ
o
j ) and (µjm, σjm)
fs, fos Nyquist frequency of ρj and ρ
o
j
σ´oj frequency domain standard deviation corresponding to σ
o
j
γjm scaling factor for σoj
X set of tuple containing parameters of Gaussian functions
G a set of Gaussian functions
Gnm an element of G
φ a set of weights for Gaussian mixture model
φnm an element of φ
M Gaussian mixture model
Mn an element of M
Qj sub-region size in pixels
σ¯j standard deviation of global smoothing filter
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